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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
          
VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Carlos Figueroa was convicted of being a felon in 
possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) 
and 924 (e).  He appeals, arguing procedural errors regarding 
the bifurcated nature of the trial and temporary discharge of 
the jury violated his rights under the Double Jeopardy and 
Due Process Clauses.  We will affirm. 
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I.  
On December 14, 2006, Figueroa sold four small 
packets of heroin to Brian Myers, an undercover Philadelphia 
Police Department (“PPD”) officer.  Myers returned later the 
same day and made a second purchase of four packets; two 
contained cocaine and two contained heroin.  Figueroa 
admitted at trial that he had sold the drugs to Myers. 
 
 During the second purchase, Myers saw “what 
appeared to be” a gun tucked into Figueroa’s waistband.  
Myers admitted that it was dark when he made this 
observation, and that he only saw a few inches of the object.  
He was not sure, therefore, that it was actually a gun.  Soon 
after this second sale, PPD officers stopped the car driven, 
and owned, by Figueroa’s girlfriend, Jennifer Sawyer.  
Figueroa was seated in the front passenger’s seat.  Officers 
removed both occupants from the car; one officer opened the 
glove compartment and recovered a handgun.  Both Sawyer 
and Figueroa denied owning, or even knowing of, the firearm.  
No forensic evidence connected either individual to the 
firearm. 
 
A grand jury indicted Figueroa on January 22, 2008.  
The grand jury charged him with one count of distribution of 
heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) 
(Count One), one count of distribution of cocaine, in violation 
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count Two), one count of carrying 
a firearm during a drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) (Count Three), and one count of 
possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e) (Count Four). 
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Figueroa’s trial started on December 14, 2009.  Count 
Four was bifurcated from the other counts.  Figueroa admitted 
that he sold the drugs and was guilty of Counts One and Two.  
He denied, however, possessing either the firearm Myers 
observed on his person or the firearm discovered in the glove 
compartment.  On December 16, the jury began deliberations 
on Counts One, Two, and Three.  Deliberations began at 3:10 
p.m., and at 4:50 p.m. the jury sent a note1 that said: “We are 
split regarding his actual possession of weapon during the 
exchange.”2
  
  At 6:00 p.m. another note was received that 
said: “Do not believe we’re going to be able to reach a 
unanimous decision on the third charge.”  
                                              
1 The language of the notes is quoted according to Judge 
McLaughlin’s on-the-record statements. 
2 During trial, the government prosecuted Count Three on an 
actual possession theory, based on Officer Myers’ testimony 
that he observed a firearm in Figueroa’s waistband.  It did not 
try to connect the firearm in the glove compartment to Count 
Three because Figueroa’s possession of the firearm, while in 
the car, was irrelevant to the charge under 18 U.S.C. § 
924(c)(1)(A).  Under § 924(c)(1)(A) the firearm must have 
been used or carried in relation to the drug trafficking crime 
or possessed in furtherance of the drug trafficking crime.  The 
government did not argue either prong was met on the facts of 
this case.  The firearm in the glove compartment was 
relevant, however, to whether Figueroa violated the 
prohibition in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) on convicted felons 
possessing a firearm that has travelled through interstate 
commerce.  To that end, the prosecuting attorney wanted to 
argue constructive possession of the firearm in the glove 
compartment in the part of the trial pertaining to Count Four. 
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The jury was reconvened the following day.  At 1:48 
p.m. the jury again sent a note, stating “Your Honor, we will 
not be able to reach a verdict on the gun charge.”  Defense 
counsel felt the jury should continue to deliberate, but Judge 
McLaughlin stated that it would be coercive given the notes 
received and time already spent deliberating.  The prosecutor 
believed the jury’s verdict should be received at that time. 
   
Judge McLaughlin then asked the prosecutor “what 
should we do with Count [Four], if indeed I do declare a 
mistrial on Count [Three], Mr. Miller?”  The prosecutor 
responded that the court should proceed with the bifurcated 
portion of the trial.  Defense counsel opposed this position, 
and argued that giving the jury Count Four would put the jury 
“back in the same situation they are right now.”  Judge 
McLaughlin agreed, and stated that it “would be coercive” to 
give them another charge after they could not decide the 
possession element of Count Three.  
  
Next, Judge McLaughlin brought the jury into the 
courtroom.  The foreperson stated that the jury had reached 
verdicts as to Counts One and Two.  Judge McLaughlin asked 
the foreperson whether it had reached a unanimous verdict as 
to Count Three.  The foreperson replied that it had not.  Judge 
McLaughlin inquired whether it would be able to reach such a 
verdict with more time, and the members of the jury indicated 
they would not reach a unanimous verdict.  Judge 
McLaughlin then published the verdicts.  The jury found 
Figueroa guilty on Counts One and Two.  Judge McLaughlin 
thanked the jury members for their service and released them.  
Immediately upon their exit, the chief of the firearms section 
of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, Francis Barbieri, presented 
himself to the court and asked that the jury be held so Count 
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Four could be further discussed.  Judge McLaughlin 
immediately sent a court employee to hold the jury. 
Barbieri stated that a finding of “manifest necessity” 
was required to properly declare a mistrial.  Barbieri 
explained that although such a finding was appropriate as to 
Count Three due to the jury’s inability to reach a verdict, it 
would not be appropriate as to Count Four if the jury was 
never presented with the Count and instructed as to its 
elements.  Judge McLaughlin stated that, “obviously when I 
made the finding that I did, I assumed there would be a retrial 
on Counts [Three] and [Four].”  Given the government’s 
concern, Judge McLaughlin left the bench and researched the 
issue.  When she returned, she concluded that she would 
bring the jury back into the courtroom to consider Count 
Four. 
  
Figueroa’s defense counsel did not object at any point 
to these events.  Judge McLaughlin brought the jury back and 
rescinded her prior dismissal.  The evidence regarding Count 
Four was set forth.  Two of the three elements of Count Four 
were stipulated: that Figueroa had a prior conviction and that 
the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce.  The 
attorneys then made short closing arguments as to the third 
element, possession.  Judge McLaughlin charged the jury on 
Count Four, and it returned a verdict of guilty.  Figueroa was 
sentenced to 180 months, the statutory minimum for Count 
Four. 
 
II. 
A. 
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 The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).  We review the 
District Court’s actions for plain error because Figueroa did 
not object below.  To demonstrate plain error an appellant 
must show: “(1) that there was an error, i.e., a deviation from 
a legal rule, (2) that the error was ‘plain,’ i.e., clear or 
obvious, and (3) that the error affected his substantial rights.”  
United States v. Corso, 549 F.3d 921, 928 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 
B. 
Figueroa contends that his rights under the Double 
Jeopardy and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment 
were violated.  Never before, he argues, has a judge asked for 
the opinions of both parties regarding dismissing a jury, 
reached a decision on the record regarding the issue, 
proceeded to dismiss the jury, and then reconvened the same 
jury and presented it with new evidence regarding an 
additional criminal charge.  After reviewing the record and 
relevant case law, we conclude that the District Court did not 
commit error, let alone plain error, when it brought the jury 
back into the courtroom and instructed it to decide Count 
Four. 
 
The discharge or release of jurors can be problematic 
because, upon release, they become susceptible to outside 
influences.  The “protective shield” imposed by a court 
throughout the proceeding aims to prevent jurors from being 
influenced by outside factors.  See People v. McNeeley, 575 
N.E.2d 926, 929 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) (describing a court’s 
efforts at preventing jurors from being influenced by 
improper outside factors as a “protective shield”).  Judges 
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reiterate this concern time and again to jurors.  When the 
jurors are discharged after their decision, the concern 
regarding outside influences ends.  Because the proceedings 
and the jury’s deliberation process can no longer be affected, 
often, as happened here, the jurors are instructed that they 
may discuss the case with the parties or other individuals.  
See United States v. Marinari, 32 F.3d 1209, 1214 (7th Cir. 
1994) (“Of course, after discharge, the jurors are quite 
properly free to discuss the case with whomever they 
choose.”).  
  
In cases such as Figueroa’s, the pivotal inquiry is 
whether the jurors became susceptible to outside influences.  
“When a jury remains as an undispersed unit within the 
control of the court and with no opportunity to mingle with or 
discuss the case with others, it is undischarged and may be 
recalled.”  Marinari, 32 F.3d at 1213 (citing Summers v. 
United States, 11 F.2d 583 (4th Cir. 1926)); see also United 
States v. Rojas, 617 F.3d 669, 678 (2d Cir. 2010) (“It is 
significant that, although the jury had technically been 
declared ‘discharged’ by the court, it had not dispersed.”).  As 
the Fourth Circuit long ago stated, “the mere announcement 
of [the jury’s] discharge does not, before they have dispersed 
and mingled with the bystanders, preclude recalling them.”  
Summers, 11 F.2d at 586 (citing AUSTIN ABBOTT, A BRIEF 
FOR THE TRIAL OF CRIMINAL CASES 730 (2d ed. 1902)). 
 
In this case, the jury returned its verdict as to Counts 
One and Two, and notified the District Court that it could not 
reach a verdict as to Count Three.  The District Court below 
retained control of the jury at all times after it informed the 
jurors they were released.  The jurors did not disperse and 
interact with any outside individuals, ideas, or coverage of the 
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proceedings.  Thus the fact that the jury was momentarily 
released did not subject them to outside influence.  
Accordingly, the District Court did not err by reconvening the 
jury for Count Four. 
C. 
We now turn to Figueroa’s Double Jeopardy claim.  
“The constitutional prohibition against ‘double jeopardy’ was 
designed to protect an individual from being subjected to the 
hazards of trial and possible conviction more than once for an 
alleged offense.”  Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 
(1957).  If a mistrial is properly declared it does not prevent 
reprosecution.  See Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 
317, 325 (1984) (“[W]e reaffirm the proposition that a trial 
court's declaration of a mistrial following a hung jury is not 
an event that terminates the original jeopardy to which 
petitioner was subjected.”).  “The power to declare a mistrial 
‘ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent 
circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes.’”  
United States v. Rivera, 384 F.3d 49, 55 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing 
United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 (1824)).  “Only 
where the mistrial is required by ‘manifest necessity’ will 
reprosecution be permitted under the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.”  Id. 
 
Here, a mistrial was properly declared regarding Count 
Three.3
                                              
3 The declaration of a mistrial does not prevent the 
government from reprosecuting the charge.  Richardson, 468 
U.S. at 325 (“[W]e reaffirm the proposition that a trial court's 
declaration of a mistrial following a hung jury is not an event 
that terminates the original jeopardy to which petitioner was 
  But, as the government noted, the record was not 
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clear as to the “manifest necessity” of declaring a mistrial 
regarding Count Four.  Judge McLaughlin decided that it may 
have been improper to declare a mistrial on Count Four 
without having any jury deliberations from which “manifest 
necessity” could be demonstrated.  Figueroa’s counsel did not 
object to her conclusion.  None of the protections afforded by 
the Double Jeopardy Clause was implicated by the District 
Court’s decision to bring the jury back into the courtroom to 
consider a charge that had not previously been presented to 
them.4
 
  If anything, this action was required to avoid 
prejudicing the government on Count Four.  See Richardson, 
468 U.S. at 326 (“The Government, like the defendant, is 
entitled to resolution of the case by verdict from the jury . . . 
.”).  For these reasons we determine that the District Court did 
not violate Figueroa’s rights under the Double Jeopardy 
Clause. 
III.  
                                                                                                     
subjected.”).  Figueroa could have been retried on Count 
Three given the appropriate “manifest necessity” finding 
made by the District Court.  See id. at 323–24 (“It has been 
established for 160 years, since the opinion of Justice Story in 
United States v. Perez, that a failure of the jury to agree on a 
verdict was an instance of ‘manifest necessity’ which 
permitted a trial judge to terminate the first trial and retry the 
defendant, because ‘the ends of public justice would 
otherwise be defeated.’” (quoting Perez, 22 U.S. 579, 580 
(1824))). 
 
4 The bifurcated nature of the trial created a situation where 
the jury was not even aware of Count Four.   
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For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm Figueroa’s 
conviction. 
